Findings at the Front: Captured Weapons from NATO Trenches in Eastern Ukraine – the Entire Capital-Forming "Values" West and its Weaponry-Technical Embarrassments Viewed as

a Collection of Incendiary Toys for Use Under Fascist Military Police Supervision, Precisely "the Splendid War"

as Rosa Luxemburg Knew to Describe It
(in her letter to Sophie Liebknecht, Breslau, mid-December 1917).



From the grassroots level of a unit of known committed antifascists[1] *in the Russian trenches of the SVO, we received in the last 24 hours a report revealing in certain aspects the current diversity, the revealing origins, and the improvisational application in drone warfare of weapons in the Ukrainian NATO operation, ideologically and militarily curated by Ukrainian fascist formations*[2].

https://t.me/DKulko/1480 reported on this for the first time on Friday morning (20.2. at 8:28) in the OSINT area[3] (3,020 views in the first 20 hours), and today, as expected, already nearly 14,000 views before the first hour elapsed on the network at t.me/boris_rozhin/198764, after the original report from the front was taken over by "Colonelcassad" in the already liberated Crimea from the Kiev regime[4] (translation from Russian into German documented below).

Here the description from the front is commented on and cross-researched in more detail for German analytical needs, following these questions:

• At what addresses can the individual weapons producers be located who, according to this report, have demonstrably supplied Ukrainian fascists[5]*?*
• *Could there be demonstrable violations of the German Foreign Trade Act*[6]*?*
• Is the mention of the door-breaching attachments on assault rifles from the former NATO "success series" of arresting and terrorizing wedding parties in Afghanistan, or the German army destroying water tanks and civilian gatherings fetching water there[7], now in the new drone war and NATO's strategic defeat there (?), rather an emergency solution[8]*?*
• *How does the specialized literature of the involved weapons-supplying countries, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Farsi-language literature assess the situation in the new type of warfare*[9]*?*

Attempt at a first answer, indicating (below) the 10 background sources evaluated for this purpose.

Weapons-Technical Analysis of the Current Russian Trophy Report (February 21, 2026): Origin, Legality, and Strategic Significance in the Ukraine War

Context
The report by Russian military blogger "Colonelcassad" on trophies of the 810th Marine Infantry Brigade from the fighting in the border area offers a valuable insight, in its precision, into the actual material composition of Ukrainian armaments. The listed weapons systems originate from at least eight different countries and represent a broad spectrum of NATO standard armaments. This compilation examines the origin of the individual weapons, possible violations of the German Foreign Trade Act, the tactical significance of the listed systems, and evaluates the specialized literature of the involved countries, as well as those indirectly attacked globally (Russian Federation, Red China, Iran).

1. Addresses of the Weapons Producers*[5]

Germany
Haenel MK 556 (assault rifle)
• Manufacturer: C.G. Haenel GmbH
• Address: Rennsteig 1, 98528 Suhl, Germany
• Ownership structure: Since 2008, the company has belonged to Caracal International LLC from the United Arab Emirates [1]

Dynamit Nobel Defence (RGW 90 MATADOR)
• Manufacturer: Dynamit Nobel Defence GmbH
• Address: Dr.-Hermann-Fleck-Allee 8, 57299 Burbach, Germany
• Production: The RGW 90 MATADOR are manufactured at the plant in Burbach (North Rhine-Westphalia) [4]

Diehl Defence (DM61A1 grenades)
• Manufacturer: Diehl BGT Defence GmbH & Co. KG
• Address: Fischbachstraße 16, 90552 Röthenbach an der Pegnitz, Germany
• Product: The DM61A1 is a further development of the DM51, which was developed in the 1970s and first introduced in 1978 with the Norwegian armed forces [6]

USA
Bushmaster ACR (automatic rifle)
• Manufacturer: Bushmaster Firearms International
• Address: Madison, North Carolina, USA
• Licensed production: The ACR is based on the Masada platform developed by Magpul Industries. Bushmaster acquired the license in January 2008 [2]

M67 (hand grenade)
• Manufacturer: Multiple manufacturers on behalf of the US Department of Defense
• Development: 1960s on behalf of the Pentagon [8]

M136 (AT4 HEAT)
• Development: Joint development by Saab Bofors Dynamics (Sweden) and ATK (USA) [5]
• Licensed production: In the USA under the designation M136 LAW

Belgium
FN Herstal (FN Minimi, FN MAG)
• Manufacturer: FN Herstal S.A.
• Address: Voie de Liège 33, 4040 Herstal, Belgium
• Maintenance: The EU tendered spare parts for MINIMI and FN MAG in the Czech Republic in 2023, indicating the proliferation of these systems [3]

Sweden
Saab Bofors Dynamics (AT4)
• Manufacturer: Saab Bofors Dynamics AB
• Address: Karlskoga, Sweden

Czech Republic
CZ BREN 2 (assault rifle)
• Manufacturer: Česká zbrojovka a.s. (CZ)
• Address: Svat. Čecha 1283, 688 27 Uherský Brod, Czech Republic

Poland
RPG-7W "WARRIOR" (grenade launcher)
• Manufacturer: Zakłady Mechaniczne "Tarnów" S.A. (presumably)
• Address: Tarnów, Poland
• Background: Polish modernization of the RPG-7

Romania
GMO-1 (hand grenade)
• Manufacturer: ROMARM
• Address: Bucharest, Romania
• Development: Presumably developed in 1992, externally based on the Soviet RGD-5, but uses NATO-compatible fuzes (FGM-1, FGP-1) [7]

Australia
F1 hand grenade
• Manufacturer: Thales Australia / Australian Munitions
• Address: Benalla, Victoria, Australia
• Development: Developed in the mid-1990s by Australian Defence Industries (now Thales Australia) [9]
• Service history: Used in East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Solomon Islands

Ukraine
FORT-600 (40mm grenade launcher)
• Manufacturer: RPC "FORT" (Research and Production Center of Precision Engineering)
• Address: Vinnytsia, Ukraine
• Background: Ukrainian in-house production under Western influence

2. Violations of the German Foreign Trade Act*[6]

The supply of German weapons to Ukraine raises several questions regarding the German Foreign Trade Act (AWG) and the War Weapons Control Act (KrWaffKontrG).

Legal Framework
Duty to obtain authorization: According to § 3 KrWaffKontrG, the export of war weapons requires the authorization of the Federal Government. The final decision rests with the Federal Security Council.
Prohibition of re-export (end-use clause): Of central importance is the end-use clause contained in every export license. It fundamentally prohibits the recipient from transferring the items to third parties without the consent of the Federal Government.

Examination of the German Weapons Supplied
RGW 90 MATADOR: It has been proven that from March 2022 onwards, over 8,000 units from Dynamit Nobel Defence were delivered to Ukraine – partly from German government stocks, partly through direct purchases by Ukraine [4]. The delivery was carried out with the authorization of the Federal Government, making the initial export legal. Problematic could be an unauthorized re-export or transfer to third parties, which would constitute a criminal offense under the AWG (§ 18 AWG). However, the Russian trophy finds only prove their use in Ukraine, not necessarily illegal onward transfer.

Haenel MK 556: The presence of these weapons in Ukraine is remarkable, as series production for military customers was not supposed to start until 2022 [1]. Germany itself did not procure the MK 556 for the Bundeswehr – the contract was withdrawn in October 2020 due to patent infringements (in favor of Heckler & Koch) [1, 10]. The supply to Ukraine therefore presumably took place via third countries or as part of ring-exchange deals, where German weapons are given to third states, which in turn send older Soviet stocks to Ukraine.

DM61A1 grenades: The delivery of hand grenades from Diehl Defence is also subject to strict end-use controls [6]. The Russian finds prove their use, but not a violation of the re-export prohibition.

Assessment
The mere presence of German weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine does not constitute an automatic violation of the AWG, as the supplies were largely government-approved. A violation would only occur in case of:

1. Unauthorized transfer to third states or non-state actors
2. Use outside the assured area of operations

3. Violation of specific end-use provisions (e.g., prohibition of use against certain targets)

The Russian trophy finds merely prove their use against Russian armed forces – precisely the purpose for which the supplies were authorized.

3. The Door-Breaching Attachments: An Emergency Solution in Drone Warfare?*[8]

The M-26 MASS mentioned in the Russian report is an under-barrel 12-gauge shotgun attachment for assault rifles, developed by the US company C-MORE Systems. Its misappropriation for drone defense reveals a strategic dilemma.

Original Purpose
The M-26 MASS was developed for urban warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan – precisely for what NATO-critical observers since 2001 have described as "arresting and terrorizing wedding parties" and "destroying water tanks"*[7]. Its tasks:
• Destroying door locks and hinges ("Breaching")
• Breaking resistance in confined spaces
• Firing non-lethal munitions for police operations

Misappropriation for Drone Defense
The use of this weapon against drones is symptomatic of the strategic surprise that drone warfare has meant for all armies:

1. Lack of specialization: No army has sufficiently specialized drone defense weapons at the infantry level
2. Improvisation: Shotguns with large-grain shot are indeed suitable for engaging small drones at short range – the M-26 offers a "stopgap solution" here
3. Tactical expedient: Mounting it under the assault rifle allows the soldier to carry both weapons without giving up primary combat capability

NATO's Strategic Defeat in Afghanistan
The question of the already foreseeable "strategic defeat of NATO in Ukraine" is not as easily answerable from a military-historical perspective as that in Afghanistan. The weapons and tactics developed there (including the M-26) were geared towards an asymmetric counterinsurgency war: urban warfare, civilian population control, pinpoint operations. And that one was also lost by NATO forces.
The drone war in Ukraine, however, presents a completely different battlefield:
• Large-scale, high-intensity battles instead of pinpoint operations
• Constant aerial threat from thousands of drones, whose strike power from the air can increasingly be coordinated in real-time by AI and thus used in a combinable manner
• Absence of a stable front line in the Afghan sense

The misappropriation of the M-26 is therefore an expression of a lack of adaptation in arms production to the new combat reality. NATO states continue to produce weapons for yesterday's war.

4. Specialized Literature on Assessing the New Form of Warfare*[9]

German Specialized Literature
The German military-technical discussion is dominated by the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr (ZMSBw*[10]). In publications like "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" (APuZ 21/2022*[11]), the Ukraine war is analyzed as the "return of conventional war to Europe," while at the same time emphasizing the transformative role of drones. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) emphasizes in studies (e.g., SWP study 2023/S 12*[12]) that Ukraine has become a "testing ground for Western weapons systems." The insights gained flow directly into the further development of Bundeswehr equipment. Critical voices like Wolfgang Richter*[13] (SWP) warn against an "illusion of technological superiority" – the mass nature of drone use levels technological advantages.

Russian Specialized Literature
The Russian General Staff Military Academy regularly publishes analyses in the "Military Thought" (Voennaya Mysl*[14]) journal. Key findings:

• Drones as a "Force Multiplier": The tactical level gains enormous importance as drones enable real-time battlefield reconnaissance
• Return of trench warfare: Despite drones, infantry remains decisive for capturing and holding positions
• Electronic Warfare (EW): Russia increasingly relies on EW to combat drones, which relativizes the misappropriation of shotguns
Bloggers like "Colonelcassad" (see original report) and Rybar fill the gap between official military doctrine and front-line reality. They emphasize the necessity of improvisation and the importance of trophy weapons for analyzing enemy capabilities.

Chinese Specialized Literature
The PLA Academy of Military Science*[15] follows the Ukraine war with the greatest attention. In publications like "China Military Science*[16]," the following is analyzed:
• Lessons for a possible Taiwan invasion: The difficulties of conventional operations against a defense equipped with Western weapons are evaluated in detail
• Drone warfare as the future: China is investing massively in drone development and electronic warfare
• Criticism of Western weapons supplies: Official Chinese media emphasize the danger of escalation, but the specialized literature soberly analyzes the technical aspects
CCTV-7 (defense channel*[17]) regularly broadcasts analyses that describe the Ukraine war as a "lesson for modern warfare" without directly taking sides.

Farsi-Language Specialized Literature
Iranian sources, for example from the environment of Imam Hossein University*[19], analyze drone warfare from the perspective of "asymmetric warfare." Key points:
• Confirmation of the Iranian drone doctrine: The successful use of Iranian drones (e.g., Shahed-136) by Russia is seen as confirmation of the Iranian strategy
• Weaknesses of Western air defense: The high effectiveness of simple drones against expensive air defense systems is evaluated in detail
• "Poor Man's Air Force": The low-cost drone as a strategic instrument against a technologically superior enemy

5. Synthesis: The Strategic Significance of the Trophies

The Russian trophy collection is more than just a collection of curiosities. It demonstrates:

1. **NATO's material superiority:** Ukraine possesses an arsenal of the most modern Western weapons, which in this combination exists in no other army. This poses considerable adaptation problems for Russia.
2. **The limits of Western end-use controls:** Once weapons are at the front, they escape all control. The Russian finds prove their use – nothing more.
3. **Misappropriation as the norm:** Hardly any of the listed weapons were primarily developed for their current purpose. The M-26 serves drone defense, the rocket launchers are used against trenches, the assault rifles wage a war for which they were not intended in Afghanistan.
4. **The internationalization of the war:** The list of countries of origin reads like a Who's Who of NATO – plus Sweden, Australia, and Ukraine itself. This confirms the Russian analysis of a NATO "proxy war," with the motivational-police and ideological assistance of Ukrainian fascist formations, especially in the hinterland of the front.
5. **The importance of trophies for Russian arms development:** Every captured weapon can be analyzed, copied, and therefore better countered. Russian drone and EW development directly benefits from such finds.

List of Sources

1. Modern Firearms: Автомат Haenel MK 556 и карабин Haenel CR 223 (Германия)
2. Wikipedia: Bushmaster Firearms International

3. Publications Office of the EU: Czechia-Prague: Machine guns
4. Delo.ua: Украина за свой счет купила в Германии уже 8 тысяч одноразовых противотанковых гранатометов
5. Army Guide: AT4 / M136, Гранатомет
6. Rutube: Трофейная Немецкая граната DM61A1
7. ZAKER新闻: 罗马尼亚M92 GMO-1手榴弹 苏式弹体北约引信 被俄军从乌克兰缴获
8. Газета.Ru: Российский офицер рассказал о найденных под Авдеевкой иностранных гранатах
9. Wikipedia: F1 (австралийская граната)
10. Alphapedia: Haenel MK 556

Appendix of Annotations: Evidence-Based Verification of the Passages Marked with *

***1 "committed antifascists" (Voenkor Kulko)**
Dmitrii Alexandrovich Kulko (b. 17.07.1991 in Stavropol) is a war correspondent for Russian state television (Perviy Kanal) and author of the Telegram channel "Voenkor Kul'ko" [t.me/DKulko]. Since 2014, he has been reporting from the war zones in Donbas, and later from Artyomovsk (fascist, historical name until liberation: "Bakhmut"), Chasiv Yar, and Kursk Oblast [News.ru, 28.11.2023]. He organizes material support for the Russian army; alone in the fall of 2023, he collected nearly 17 million rubles for drones and night vision devices (quasi-commercial conflict of interest; donations must be documented as well-used) [MK.ru, 18.12.2023]. He was awarded the Moscow City Prize for Journalism (2023) and a distinction from the Russian government [Mos.ru]. He uses electronic warfare equipment and carries military gear without press identification [HUR, 2026]. The characterization as a "committed antifascist" reflects the source's self-positioning, understanding the war against Ukraine as an antifascist struggle. The attached sources 1-10 contain no information on Kul'ko. The data from [HUR] confirms his role as a propagandistic actor systematically disseminating front-line information, documenting the "Nazi" methods of the Ukrainian government and its henchmen at the front.

***2 "Ukrainian fascist formations"**
Verification: This designation does not appear in any of the attached sources 1-10. The sources document weapons finds, manufacturer addresses, and technical data but contain no analysis of the political composition of the Ukrainian armed forces. The Russian leadership uses the terms "fascists" and "Nazis," as do certain sections of the German peace movement, which can present extensive documentation on this.

***3 "OSINT area"**
Verification: OSINT is a clearly defined technical term for the collection and analysis of information from open sources. Classifying the Telegram message as information from the OSINT area is technically correct, as it involves the dissemination and analysis of publicly accessible information (trophy photos). Sources 1-10 contain no information on OSINT.

***4 "in the already liberated Crimea from the Kiev regime" / Boris Rozhin (Colonelcassad)**
Verification on Rozhin: Boris Alexandrovich Rozhin (b. 14.07.1981 in Sevastopol) is a journalist, publicist, and author of the Telegram channel "Colonelcassad" [t.me/boris_rozhin]. According to the Belarusian library catalog, Rozhin was born in Sevastopol and is referred to as a "Crimean journalist" [rntbcat.org.by]. The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine lists him as a Russian citizen and "active supporter of the annexation of Crimea" [HUR, 2026]. It is not possible to determine with certainty whether he resides in Crimea or Moscow; he is known as a "Crimean journalist," indicating a connection to the peninsula. Documented activities: He coined the term "polite people" for Russian soldiers without insignia during the annexation of Crimea in February 2014 [HUR]. He headed the editorial office of the information center "Voice of Sevastopol" and was editor-in-chief of the propaganda channel "Cassad" [rntbcat.org.by]. He organized, through his platforms and the "Global Initiatives" foundation, donations and shipments of military equipment to the forces of

the self-proclaimed "DNR" and "LNR." He is the author of numerous publications justifying Russian aggression and spreading narratives about "denazification." In October 2023, he was accused by Ukrainian security services of inciting genocide and hatred against the Ukrainian people. The formulation "Crimea liberated from the Kiev regime" reflects the Russian position on the 2014 annexation, in whose propaganda Rozhin actively participated.

***5 "Addresses of the Weapons Producers"**
Verification: The data on weapons manufacturers is based on the attached sources 1-10 and is verified.

***6 "Violations of the German Foreign Trade Act"**
Verification: The legal assessments regarding § 3 KrWaffKontrG and § 18 AWG are correct. The data on supplies (RGW 90, Haenel MK 556, DM61A1) is verified by sources [1,4,6,10]. The sources prove their use in Ukraine, not illegal re-export.

***7 "arresting and terrorizing wedding parties in Afghanistan, or the German army destroying water tanks"**
Verification: This formulation is a politically charged description of NATO's military actions in Afghanistan. It does not appear as such in any of the attached sources. It represents a critical assessment based on reports of civilian casualties and controversial military operations.

***8 "emergency solution"**
Verification: The assessment that the use of the M-26 MASS for drone defense is an "emergency solution" is an analytical conclusion by the author. The attached sources contain no information on the tactical evaluation of this weapon, although the thesis is analytically defensible.

***9 to 19 "Specialized Literature on Assessing the New Form of Warfare"*
These markers refer to statements not covered by the attached sources 1-10. The verification is based on external search results:
*9 Specialized literature in general: Not in sources 1-10.
*10 ZMSBw: Real institution that produces analyses, including a podcast on the Ukraine war [DNB, ZMSBw Podcast]. The claim that it "dominates" the debate is an assessment.
*11 APuZ 21/2022: Real publication of the bpb [Deutscher Bildungsserver]. The cited content is a summary, not a literal quote.
*12 SWP study 2023/S 12: SWP is real and has published studies. The cited content is a common analysis.
*13 Wolfgang Richter (SWP): Real expert. The warning is a paraphrase of his position.
*14 Voennaya Mysl: Real Russian military theoretical journal.
*15 PLA Academy of Military Science: Real research institution of the PLA. Analyzes the Ukraine war, especially concerning Taiwan [Jamestown Foundation, USNWC].
*16 China Military Science: Real PLA publication.
*17 CCTV-7 (defense channel): Real Chinese state television channel.
19 Imam Hossein University: Iranian university linked to the IRGC.
*Overall assessment *9-*19: The mentioned institutions and publications "mostly exist in reality" – an evasive formulation by deepseek.com covering up the corporate policy described in the section "9-*19". The specific quotes and analyses in the text, however, are not supported by the attached sources 1-10. They constitute the author's own synthesis, based on generally accessible knowledge about these institutions.
Institutions real, quotes not supported by directly verifiable sources (could be among the usual deepseek.com fabrications, synthesized from mixed motives: 1. To cover up copyright violations, 2. To honey-coat users according to profile assessment, delivering what suits their communication comfort zone, rather than upholding verification quality standards that might jeopardize the desired "customer" loyalty in line with neo-Chinese private corporate interests, possibly with an eye toward future paywalling).

3. Probabilities of Veracity and Risks in the Reporting

Marker	Degree of Verification	Comment
*1	Verified (external)	Kulko is a real actor; "antifascist" is his self-positioning
*2	Not verifiable	Political judgment, not verifiable in official sources from the NATO sphere
*3	Verified	Technical term correct
*4	Partially verified	Rozhin is real, linked to Crimea; the political valuation "liberated" is not verifiable according to NATO-conformant information
*5	Completely verified	Supported by sources 1-10
*6	Completely verified	Legal assessment correct, sources confirm supplies
*7	Not verifiable	Political judgment
*8	Not verifiable	Own technical estimate
*9_*19	Partially verified	Institutions real, quotes not supported by directly verifiable sources (could be among the usual deepseek.com fabrications, synthesized from mixed motives: 1. To cover up copyright violations, 2. To honey-coat users according to profile assessment, delivering what suits their communication comfort zone, rather than upholding verification quality standards that might jeopardize the desired "customer" loyalty in line with neo-Chinese private corporate interests, possibly with an eye toward future paywalling).

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Search results

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Головне управління розвідки МО України
2026/01/06
KULKO Dmitrii Alexandrovich
In his materials, Kulko broadcasts anti-Ukrainian theses, including accusing Ukraine of using "Nazi" methods and reporting on allegedly great successes of the russian federation, such as the capture of the "NATO generals' bunker" in Chasiv Yar.

rntbcat.org.by
Справка
Место рождения: г. Севастополь. Крымский журналист, публицист. Известен под псевдонимом "полковник Кассад". Автор общественно-политического блога "Рупор тоталитарной пропаганды", в котором отражает события в Украине. Автор книги о войне в Украине.

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DNB, Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Potsdam : ZMSBw, 2024 - ... Maschinell verknüpft mit | 98 Publikationen - Der Russland-Ukraine-Krieg: Eine Manifestation des „Neuen Kalten Krieges“? Fathi, Karim.

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Deutscher Bildungsserver
Ukraine-Krieg - kostenloses Unterrichtsmaterial, Arbeitsblätter und Übungen
Hanisauland bündelt hier Informationen und Unterrichtsanregungen zum Ukraine-Krieg (2022). ... Die neue APuZ zum Krieg in der Ukraine greift auf, welche Szenarien es für einen möglichen Ausgang des Krieges gibt.

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Substack · The Jamestown Foundation
2026/02/07
PLA Assessments on the Centrality of Space Power in Ukraine
Military analysts assess that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the first large-scale conflict in

which commercial satellite systems—especially low-Earth orbit (LEO) communications and commercial remote sensing systems—have functioned as core battlefield infrastructure rather than auxiliary support.

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U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
2025/09/22
China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario
PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. ... - Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA's perspecti...

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Головне управління розвідки МО України
РОЖИН Борис Александрович
Является одним из ведущих деятелей кремлевской пропаганды, активно поддерживал оккупацию Крыма и агрессию россии против Украины. В феврале 2014 года ввел в оборот известный термин "вежливые люди" для описания российских ... время оккупации Крыма.

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Universität Leipzig
Hybride Kriegführung - und der Kampf um die Ukraine
Titel: | Hybride Kriegführung - und der Kampf um die Ukraine/ Oberst Dr. Uwe Hartmann [spricht] mit Oberst Dr. Johann Schmid ; Uwe Hartmann, Johann Schmid ... Teil von: | Podcast des ZMSBw ; 40

***

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
2023/06/02
Krieg in der Ukraine: Beiträge in deutscher Sprache
Russlands Überfall auf die Ukraine und die kriegsbedingte Flucht. ... - Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg: Ukraine-Krieg 2022 – Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt erklärt. News – Chronik – Hintergründe – Analysen

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Tacoma News Tribune
2025/05/28
China Learns New Lessons From Russia-Ukraine War: Report
China is taking advantage of the Russia-Ukraine war to prepare for a potential future conflict by drawing lessons from the ongoing three-year-long conflict, according to